The Undead State

Why Bureaucracy Refuses to Die

2025-02-16 V1.1 Second web edition

This isn’t the first time a government has tried to dismantle itself.

In 1995, after decades of declining relevance, the federal government abolished the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), once a powerhouse of economic regulation. But it took years to phase out its responsibilities, and many of its functions were simply absorbed into other agencies.

Now, in 2025, Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) is attempting a far more aggressive approach, pushing rapid workforce reductions, agency restructuring, and program cuts. Supporters hail it as long-overdue reform, while critics warn of chaos and the erosion of essential public services.

But history suggests that bureaucracy, once created, rarely disappears. It changes form.

The Origins: Pragmatic Solutions to Specific Problems

At the nation’s founding, the federal bureaucracy was minimal, with only a handful of agencies handling diplomacy, war, and treasury management. The Founders were skeptical of a large central government, and early agencies served more as extensions of presidential authority than independent entities.

However, as the nation expanded and economic life became more complex, Congress found it impractical to manage policy implementation directly. The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was created in 1887 to regulate railroads, marking one of the first instances of a federal agency with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. This set a precedent for future agencies to act with a degree of autonomy.

What began as a pragmatic solution soon became a defining feature of the American administrative state.

Growth and Specialization: The Rise of the Administrative State

By the early 20th century, the federal government was no longer just an enforcer of laws but an active regulator of industries and social conditions. The Progressive Era brought agencies like the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), reflecting a belief that specialized expertise was necessary to handle economic and public health issues.

The New Deal of the 1930s expanded federal oversight, creating agencies like the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Social Security Administration (SSA), and Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to manage economic recovery and public welfare. Unlike earlier agencies, these became permanent fixtures, cementing executive authority over economic policy.

With each crisis, the government responded by adding more agencies. What began as a response to instability evolved into a permanent system of specialized bureaucracies.

The Shift Toward Bureaucratic Rigidity

As agencies expanded, they developed internal rules, specialized personnel, and institutional cultures that made them increasingly resistant to change. Several factors contributed to this rigidity:

Congressional Delegation and Rulemaking Power

By passing broad legislation, Congress allows agencies to interpret and enforce laws through rulemaking, effectively giving them legislative power. These regulations become deeply embedded, making later revisions legally and politically difficult.

Self-Preservation and Expansion

Federal agencies have strong incentives to expand their mandates to justify continued funding and relevance. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), for example, was originally focused on pollution control but later broadened its scope to climate policy. Bureaucrats frequently resist downsizing, arguing that new challenges justify additional oversight.

The Civil Service System

The Pendleton Act (1883) and later civil service reforms shield bureaucrats from political interference, ensuring continuity across administrations. However, this also makes agencies insulated from accountability, even when inefficient. Firing federal employees remains legally and procedurally difficult, further entrenching bureaucratic inertia.

Judicial Deference and Administrative Rulemaking

For decades, courts followed Chevron deference, instructing judges to defer to agency interpretations of vague statutes. This strengthened agency power and cemented regulations that became difficult to challenge. While recent Supreme Court decisions have begun limiting this deference, agencies still wield significant rulemaking authority.

These forces have collectively shaped a bureaucracy that is not only expansive but also deeply resistant to reform, precisely the conditions that DOGE has set out to dismantle.

The Modern Bureaucratic State and the DOGE Reforms

Today, agencies are deeply embedded in governance, making reform extraordinarily difficult. While DOGE aims to cut inefficiency, its mass layoffs, rapid agency closures, and sweeping budget cuts have sparked controversy. Critics argue that it risks gutting critical government functions without addressing the underlying reasons bureaucracies exist in the first place.

DOGE’s Approach to Reform

Massive Workforce Reductions: DOGE-backed workforce orders and agency actions pointed toward large reductions, with DOGE arguing that a leaner workforce would increase efficiency. Critics warned that the loss of institutional knowledge could disrupt essential public services, as decades of policy expertise might disappear quickly.
Elimination of Agencies: DOGE and Trump administration officials targeted agencies and programs such as USAID for closure, transfer, or deep reduction. Critics warned this could leave key functions unfulfilled or push responsibility onto state governments ill-prepared to manage them.
Privatization Push: DOGE has aggressively advocated for shifting some government functions to private industry, arguing that competition will drive efficiency. However, history suggests that privatization often comes with tradeoffs. What is efficient for businesses does not always align with the broader goals of public accountability.

While DOGE claims to be improving efficiency, history suggests that true reform is far more complex. Large-scale agency eliminations, such as the ICC’s dissolution, took decades to implement and required significant restructuring. Whether DOGE’s cuts will lead to meaningful efficiency gains or create new governance challenges remains to be seen.

Conclusion: The Bureaucracy We Have, for Better or Worse

Federal bureaucracy is inefficient, but reform is rarely simple. DOGE’s aggressive downsizing highlights the tension between efficiency and governance: Can we streamline government without losing essential functions?

What might DOGE’s long-term impact be? Could this lead to a future administration reinstating these agencies, or will private industry permanently absorb their roles?

History suggests that dismantling agencies is easier said than done. Will DOGE’s cuts truly create a more efficient government, or just shift bureaucracy into a new form?